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Abstract 
A state-led industrialization push inspired by the East Asian ‘developmental 
state’ model is at the centre of Ethiopia’s recent economic success. This 
model has historically proved potent for achieving rapid industrialization, but 
the business-state alliance at the heart of the model generally aimed to curb 
the power of labour. Focusing on textile and leather manufacturing in 
Ethiopia, this article addresses two questions: are workers capable of 
extracting gains from the process of industrialization, and have the actions of 
workers affected global value chain integration in the two industries? Our 
data shows that opportunities for collective voice among workers are limited. 
However, workers have expressed their discontent by leaving employers 
when working conditions fail to meet their expectations. The resulting 
turnover has generated significant obstacles for local and foreign firms 
attempting to participate in global value chains. In response, the Ethiopian 
state and employers implemented a number of measures, including 
restrictions on emigration and more generous non-wage benefits. Recent 
research on global value chains and labour highlights how workers are able 
to influence work practices through individual action. The present article 
builds on these ideas, but shows that firms and governments have the ability 
to respond and limit this power. 
 
 
THEORISTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH HAVE LONG been concerned	by the contribution of 
labour to economic development. Authors have argued that labour is a drain on 
economic surplus and a source of unproductive rents,1 one element in a broader 
strategy of accumulation,2 or a positive resource for late industrializing nations.3 
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Ethiopia’s recent economic growth represents an interesting case due to the country’s 
ambitious plan to industrialize through labour-intensive manufacturing. While a 
number of studies have shed light on the policies implemented by the Ethiopian 
government to encourage the development of the leather, textiles, cement, and cut-
flower industries, the literature generally has considered labour dynamics to be a 
peripheral issue with little direct bearing on industrialization.4 
  In this article, we focus particularly on textile and leather manufacturing.5 The 
Ethiopian government has identified the two industries as priority industries in its 
overarching development plans, and it hopes to capitalize on the country’s low labour 
costs in order to attract foreign investment, build up technological capacity, and 
participate in global value chains (GVCs).6 While a number of studies have suggested 
that formal manufacturing employment offers higher wages than agriculture or the 
informal sector,7 the transition to industrial work has not always been embraced by 
workers. As E.P. Thompson’s classic study of time-discipline in British factories has 
shown, agricultural workers may not find it easy to adapt to the discipline of factory 
work.8 In turn, the presence of labour conflicts may affect flows of foreign direct 
investment or lead to lower productivity growth.9 Gareth Austin also argues that part 
of East Asia’s successful industrialization in its early stages was attributable to the 
availability of female labourers who, socialized in the conditions of wet-rice 
agriculture, were likely to provide disciplined and timely work.10 Given that nearly 80 
percent of the Ethiopian workforce is currently engaged in subsistence agriculture, 
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questions remain regarding its capacity to be productive in an industrial 
environment.11 
  In this article, we explore the strategies adopted by workers to improve working 
conditions and wages in leather and textile manufacturing. Moreover, we assess how 
the actions of workers have affected the ability of firms to participate in GVCs in the 
two industries. We contribute to the literature on labour and development by showing 
that work practices and the distribution of gains between labour and capital is the 
outcome of the inter-dependent actions of workers, investors and the state. The article 
begins with a general overview of the Ethiopian industrialization model and of the 
policies enacted by the government to incentivize participation in textile and leather 
GVCs. We then review the literature on labour and development in the context of a 
country increasingly integrated in the global economy through GVCs. A short section 
on the methodology underpinning our study follows. Next, drawing on interviews and 
factory visits conducted within the textile and leather industries, we explain how, even 
in an environment where the trade union movement is weak, workers have exerted 
pressure on firms through high labour turnover. We go on to show that the 
government and employers have responded by pursuing a mix of strategies that aim to 
circumvent or undermine both collective and individual forms of labour agency. We 
conclude with some thoughts on the implications of ‘developmental’ policies for 
employment relations in the textile and leather industries. 
 
 
Ethiopia’s industrialization push: industrial policy and GVC participation in the 
textile and leather industries 
 
In the mid-1980s, Ethiopia pierced the conscience of the world when a devastating 
famine took the lives of hundreds of thousands of its citizens. The image of Ethiopia 
as a drought and famine-stricken country in need of salvation, as portrayed in a 1984 
BBC television report, still sticks for many. But in recent years the narrative has 
started to change. The vision of Meles Zenawi – Ethiopia’s strongman from 1991 
until his death in 2012 – of an Ethiopia pursuing the fast-paced growth and 
industrialization strategy of Japan, the Asian ‘tigers’,12 and China, is slowly emerging. 
  Since 2004 – when policies from the first national development plan, the Sustainable 
Development and Poverty Reduction Programme (SDPRP), started to materialize – 
Ethiopia’s economy has boomed. Real GDP per capita skyrocketed from US$214 in 
2004 to $511 in 2016.13 While economic growth started from a low base, an annual 
real GDP per capita growth rate of 7.5 percent over a 12-year time span compares 
favourably with other sub-Saharan economies. State-funded infrastructure projects 
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have been driving the economic boom. In recent years, more than 50 percent of the 
federal budget has been spent on infrastructure projects, primarily transport and power 
generation.14 For many though, it is the anticipation of rapid industrialization that 
creates the Ethiopia ‘buzz’. While manufacturing value added (MVA) as a share of 
the economy remains at a modest 4.8 percent,15 well below the African average of 10 
percent,16 manufactured goods exports have grown from $21 million to $389 million 
between 2004 and 2016.17 This represents more than a doubling of manufactured 
goods’ share of total merchandise exports, which itself has grown from $678m to 
$2919m over this time period.18 Unsurprisingly, scholars have started to devote 
attention to the industrialization push. Some authors focus on industrial policy and 
economic performance more widely,19 some on the politics of industrialization and 
the ‘developmental state’,20 and others on partly successful sectors like floriculture,21 
leather products,22 and textiles.23 
  The Growth and Transformation Plan II, Ethiopia’s 2015 national development 
strategy, singles out the textile and leather industries as priority manufacturing 
industries.24 The government believes that these industries can help ease foreign 
exchange scarcity (i.e. export promotion), absorb labour, and promote economic links 
with the agricultural sector, especially cotton and livestock. Because a large share of 
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Ethiopia’s population depends on agriculture for its livelihood, industrial policy in 
Ethiopia emphasizes the need to develop manufacturing industries that provide 
linkages to the agricultural sector (inspired especially by Albert Hirschman’s notion 
of backward linkages).25 Additionally, the government's commitment to the growth of 
these industries is based on historical observations of industrialization amongst its 
‘developmental’ forerunners – starting out with labour-intensive industries with 
relatively low technological entry barriers, before moving on to more sophisticated 
industrial activities.26 
  The government has formulated a number of industrial policies to support growth in 
the textile and leather industries. These are summarized in Table 1. While such 
policies target a wider range of industries, textiles and leather manufacturing bear 
significant importance because of their designation as priority industries.  
 






Several new government agencies have been set up to provide state 
support to prioritized industries more effectively. Examples of such 
institutions include the Ethiopian Investment Commission (established in 
1992, revitalized in 2014), the Industrial Parks Development 
Corporation, and the Ethiopian Industrial Inputs Supply Enterprise. The 
Ethiopian Textile Industry Development Institute (ETIDI), and the 
Ethiopian Leather Industry Development Institute (LIDI) were set up 
specifically to support growth in the textile and leather industries. 
Credit allocation: 
Development Bank 
of Ethiopia (DBE) 
and Commercial 
Bank of Ethiopia 
(CBE) 
These are state owned banks that provide subsidized credit to prioritised 
industries. The DBE provides investment capital, whereas the CBE 
provides working capital. 
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Several incentives are in place to encourage exports in prioritized 
industries. These incentives target export-oriented firms, and include: 
reduced interest rates on loans from the DBE and the CBE, subsidized 
leasing of land, subsidized salaries for foreign ‘experts’, and tax 
exemptions. Currency depreciation can also be understood as an export 
promotion instrument.  
FDI attraction 
Several measures have been put in place to attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in prioritized industries in order to create employment, 
generate export earnings, and transfer technology. Such measures 
include favourable access to infrastructure (e.g. industrial parks and rail 
transport), tax exemptions, and subsidized land leases (in some cases, 
free land).  
Infrastructure 
investments 
Infrastructure investments, especially power generation and transport, 




  Foreign direct investments have become particularly important for the textile and 
leather industries, as most Ethiopian companies lack the technology, capital, and 
knowhow to be internationally competitive. There have been signs that the 
government’s commitment to attract FDI is working: manufacturing FDI in Ethiopia 
increased from $570m in 2007/08 to $3,712m in 2016/17.28 Export revenues in the 
textile and leather industries also increased: textile exports rose from $17m in 2007/08 
to $79m in 2015/16,29 and leather exports increased from $75m to $118m over the 
same time period.30 Textile exports will most likely continue to rise into the future, as 
the massive export-oriented industrial park projects, such as Hawassa Industrial Park, 
begin their operations. 
  However, it is still too early to say whether Ethiopia’s export push and foreign direct 
investment attraction strategy is contributing to sustained growth in the textile and 
leather industries. Most inputs needed for the production of goods destined for the 
international market are imported, signalling a worrying trend of import dependence. 
For example, Cornelia Staritz and colleagues point out that imports of fabric, yarn and 
raw fibres increased from $70m in 2004 to $370m in 2014.31 In fact, Ethiopia’s trade 
deficit stood at $13.1bn in 2017, a steep increase from $2bn in 2004.32 Furthermore, 
successful industrialization means more than an increase in GVC participation 
through FDI attraction and exports. Ultimately, domestic firms need to develop 
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productive capabilities and contribute to the domestic economy’s international 
competitiveness. For this to happen, linkages must be created between foreign and 
domestic firms and technology needs to be transferred from foreign to domestic 
firms.33   
 
 
Labour and global value chains: a review 
 
As Andy Cumbers and colleagues argue, investors and firms operating within GVCs 
are not immune to one of the key challenges faced by any capitalist enterprise: 
managing its workforce.34 Firms must ‘successfully incorporate labour into the 
production process; [...] exercise control over labour time in the production process 
and [...] exploit labour as part of the process of commodification to realize surplus 
value’.35 
However, authors studying GVCs have paid relatively little attention to employment 
relations. According to Neil Coe and David Jordhus-Lier, in most of the GVC 
literature ‘[l]abour is [...] simply assumed to be an intrinsic part of the production 
process and workers are typically presented as passive victims of capital’s inexorable 
global search for cheaper wages’.36 In response, Coe and Jordhus-Lier have called for 
a greater sensitivity to the agency of labour within research on GVCs. Echoing this 
argument, Christina Niforou contends that ‘private governance’, particularly the 
actions of lead firms, have received too much attention to the detriment of community 
and worker-led initiatives.37 
  For Al Rainnie and colleagues, the global production network (GPN) approach 
offers a more complete framework for grasping the role played by labour in the 
contemporary global economy.38 This is because the GPN literature is more sensitive 
to power dynamics and to the multiplicity of social actors involved in value chains.  
Neil Coe, Peter Dicken and Martin Hess argue that the GVC literature has a more 
limited focus on the ‘governance of inter-firm transactions’, while the GPN approach 
‘attempts to encompass all relevant sets of actors and relationships’, including the 
state, trade unions and firms’.39 Yet, the literature on GPNs does not yet offer very 
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clear theoretical propositions regarding the specific ways in which labour can affect 
the operation of value chains.40 Rainnie and colleagues contend that workers should 
be treated as ‘active shapers of [production] networks’,41 capable of intervening at 
different geographical scales and at different points or ‘nodes’ of the network to 
defend their interests. In a study of the cut flower sector in Kenya and Tanzania, Lone 
Riisgard showed for instance that local trade unions in Tanzania were able to 
negotiate and extract concessions around the implementation of international labour 
standards.42 Applying a Marxist perspective, Ben Selwyn goes further by arguing that 
the struggle between capital and labour often determines institutional arrangements 
within value chains.43 
  Yet, most of the recent literature on labour and GVC/GPNs has focused on trade 
unions and other collective actors, neglecting how workers can also exert pressure 
through their actions as individuals.44 As Grace Carswell and Geert de Neve argue, a 
theoretical framework that aims to capture the role played by labour must not only be 
sensitive to the actions of trade unions and other collective actors, but also to ‘micro-
agency’45 or the ‘low-key and often invisible ways by which people with very limited 
material means make viable lives’.46 In their research on the Tiruppur textile cluster in 
India, Carswell and De Neve illustrate how workers’ diverse motivations can actively 
shape employment practices.47 The authors report that over the course of their study, 
several firms altered their practices in order to attract workers with particular 
characteristics. For instance, in order to retain male tailors – a group of workers who 
prioritize high earnings over job security – firms in the cluster increased their use of 
piece-rate systems. In contrast, large factories began to offer accommodation on site 
in order to cater to the female migrant workforce. Ben Rogaly also highlights how 
Indian men who migrate to take up low-paid and low skilled jobs rarely do so out of 
desperation and are rather pursuing long-term goals such as saving money to become 
traders.48  
  Two scholars offer theoretical frameworks which are helpful for studying the varied 
forms of worker agency. For Chris Smith, indeterminacy lies at the centre of 
employment relationships.49 According to the author, most of the industrial relations 
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literature has focused on the variability of worker effort and has paid less attention to 
another fundamental form of indeterminacy: workers’ ability to terminate their 
employment contract at will.50 Smith argues that the study of employment relations 
must take into account both forms of worker power – ‘work-effort’ and ‘mobility-
effort’. Albert O. Hirschman develops a similar argument through his 
conceptualization of ‘exit’, ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’.51 For Hirschman, economic actors 
can pursue two fundamental strategies in the face of unsatisfactory or deteriorating 
conditions in human organizations: ‘exit’, the action of leaving an undesirable 
environment and ‘voice’, expressing discontent. While Hirschmann and Smith cover 
similar terrain, Hirschmann’s model is based on a more complex understanding of 
human agency: the individual worker is a strategic actor, capable of selecting between 
alternative courses of action. 
  In a context like Ethiopia, however, where the state is committed to strong 
intervention in the economy, any analysis of labour dynamics must take into account 
the actions of the government. As Coe and Jordhus-Lier note, ‘the potential for 
worker action should always be seen in relation to the formations of capital, the state, 
the community and the labour market in which workers are incontrovertibly yet 
variably embedded’.52 In his critique of ‘elite development theory’, Ben Selwyn 
argues convincingly that class conflict ultimately shapes the policies and behaviour of 
state actors.53 Yet in the present article, we do not exclude prima facie the possibility 
that the state may act according to its own distinct interests. The Ethiopian 
government’s explicit emulation of East Asian developmental states does, however, 
raise questions regarding the type of employment regime emerging in the country. 
Several authors have argued that a non-existent, co-opted, or suppressed labour 
movement kept wages low, and helped maintain the competitiveness of light 
manufacturing in the ‘Tiger’ economies.54 Especially in Korea, but also in Singapore, 
the state curtailed organized labour by repressing or co-opting independent unions. In 
Hong Kong and Taiwan, the intermingling of kinship ties and business networks 
limited the emergence of working class militancy.55 
  In the context of a world characterized by the rise of GVCs, research on the impact 
of labour agency must therefore address three key issues: labour’s capacity to act 
collectively or individually; workers’ tendency to achieve their goals through a 
variety of means including ‘effort’, ‘voice’, and ‘exit’; and the state and capital’s role 
																																								 																				
50 Ibid, p. 390. 
51 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and 
states (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1970). 
52 Coe and Jordhus-Lier, ‘Constrained agency? Re-evaluating the geographies of labour’, p. 214. 
53 Benjamin Selwyn, ‘Elite development theory: A labour-centred critique’, Third World Quarterly 37, 
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in shaping the context of industrial relations. With this in mind, our article therefore 
asks: have the actions of labour organizations and workers shaped working conditions 
in the textile and leather-industries in Addis Ababa?  Has worker behaviour affected 





We conducted fieldwork between April and June 2015 and September and December 
2016 in and around the capital city, Addis Ababa. At the time of fieldwork, 
manufacturing employment in the country was largely concentrated in urban areas, 
especially Addis, and while not entirely representative of economic conditions 
elsewhere in the country, the city and surrounding areas best captured what economic 
growth has entailed for Ethiopia. In addition, due to the proximity of firms, 
government agencies, and trade union officials, Addis Ababa was the best location to 
conduct a first investigation on employment relations in the textile and leather 
industries. In the context of a wider project on economic transformation, we 
interviewed managers and owners from 33 firms in the two industries, including 
foreign and locally owned, as well as representatives from trade and business 
associations and governmental institutions.  
  As the present article focuses on labour issues in firms that are participating in global 
value chains, we sought out companies that produce for the export market or are on 
the verge of doing so. These were typically the largest firms in their respective 
industries, as measured by export revenue, and likely to have the largest economic 
impact in Ethiopia. We interviewed managers and owners from 15 firms in the leather 
industry (six foreign and nine locally owned) and 18 firms in the textile industry 
(eleven foreign and seven locally owned). Among all firms interviewed, two locally 
owned firms in the leather industry and one locally owned firm in the textile industry 
had not yet started exporting. All other firms were producing for the export market. 
  We prepared an interview schedule which covered topics pertaining to the 
management of skills and labour and encouraged private sector representatives to 
share their perspective on unions, workforce management, and the government’s 
labour policies. Alongside these questions, the interviews also focused on broader 
challenges related to the expansion of production and access to international markets. 
As noted by John Budd and Devasheesh Bhave, firms and managers aim to maximize 
profit and often seek to exert greater power and control over workers.56 Their 
interpretation of labour problems was often shaped by this goal. For this reason, the 
perspective of labour was also sought. Interviews were held with three officials from 
the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions, staff at two international labour NGOs, 
and a total of 16 workers in two firms that allowed us to speak with their employees: 
‘Textiles Corp.’, a manufacturer of garments producing exclusively for the local 
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market with approximately 350 employees, and ‘Leather Inc.’, a European company 
exporting 100 percent of its products and employing over 700 workers. The names of 
all private sector organizations and individuals have been changed to ensure 
confidentiality. 
  The worker interviews focused on their motivation to accept a job in a leather or 
textile factory, their degree of attachment to the firm, and the reasons underlying their 
decision to leave a previous job or to remain with their present employer. More 
interviews with workers could not be conducted due to financial, logistical, and time 
constraints. Although our sample of workers is small and conducting interviews in 
two firms limits the generalizability of our findings, the participants tended to share 
similar perspectives on industrial work. This was the case despite significant 
differences in terms of age, gender, and work roles. 
  We conducted all interviews in English, with the exception of those held with 
workers. In the latter case, an interpreter was present and translated questions and 
responses between English and Amharic. The statements of workers and managers 
were analysed and coded to identify commonalities and contrasts with respect to the 
topics of productivity, labour relations and labour turnover. By reconciling these 
perspectives, we were able to obtain a more complete understanding of employment 
relations in the sectors. For instance, while most managers described workers as 
undisciplined, the worker interviews revealed that the actions of protesting, leaving a 
company, or failing to be present at work were motivated by more complex rationales.  
  Moreover, we completed a literature review of research on labour relations and 
industrial work in Ethiopia. Studies conducted on the manufacturing and cut-flower 
sectors have occasionally addressed labour issues and this material was triangulated 
with our own data on the textile and leather industries. By reconciling these sources of 
information, we were able to identify a set of labour and employment issues which 
were consistent across industrial sectors, and relevant to the textile and leather 
industries.  
  The conclusions of the study must be circumscribed to firms operating in and around 
Addis Ababa. Workers living in regional centres have more limited job opportunities, 
particularly in the manufacturing sector, and may feel less confident about their 
ability to find another job. Moreover, the textile and leather industries are labour-
intensive, and require a relatively large number of unskilled or semi-skilled workers. 
Firms operating in more capital-intensive value chains are likely to encounter workers 
with stronger bargaining power. Nonetheless, obtaining data on workers’ attitudes 
towards industrial work in Ethiopia addresses an important gap in the literature, and 
serves as good starting point for future, large-scale investigations. Future research 
would be well served by focusing on key differences between industries and by 
looking at factors such as geographical location, the demographic characteristics of 
the work-force and capital intensity. 
   





Along with programmes and tax breaks to incentivize industrial upgrading, Ethiopia’s 
industrial policies are characterized by a centralized and hierarchical approach to 
employment relations. While the EPRDF’s ideology draws heavily from Marxism, its 
ideological roots stem from regional liberation movements and the mobilization of 
peasants.57 The industrial proletariat does not have a strong role within the party. 
Following the fall of the Derg regime and the rise to power of the EPRDF, the state-
controlled All-Ethiopia Trade Unions was replaced in 1993 by another national trade 
union organization: the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions (CETU).58 While 
the organization was free to operate independently during the early 1990s, labour 
leaders’ criticism of the country’s privatization policies led the EPRDF government to 
re-establish control over CETU through a series of legal and political moves.59  
  CETU formally interacts with the government through the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs. A tripartite committee composed of five representatives from CETU, 
five from the Ethiopian Employer’s Federation, and five from the Ministry was in 
place at the time of fieldwork. This committee served as the main forum where the 
social partners could raise labour-related issues with the government. The Prime 
Minister’s office also established a labour advisory committee in 2014, but several 
informants expressed doubts regarding the regularity of meetings and the 
effectiveness of this body.60 Overall, CETU and the Ethiopian Employer’s Federation 
have had little influence on the overarching developmental plans of the state.  
  Despite recent claims, CETU is not a government union.61 The organization attempts 
to represent workers in various policy discussions, fought changes to the employment 
protection provisions of the labour law and regularly denounces attacks on organizing 
rights.62 Yet its actions and statements take place in a manner that does not oppose the 
wider objectives of the regime. Indeed, in an interview, a senior CETU official 
described the organization as a mediator between the developmental objectives of the 
Ethiopian state and the interests of workers.63  
  CETU is divided into nine sectoral associations of varying sizes (see Table 2).  In 
2010, trade union density stood at 14.8 percent, a slight decline compared with a rate 
of 16 percent recorded in 1999.64 Membership is low, especially since the majority of 
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the Ethiopian labour force is not in waged work and is excluded from union density 
calculations. The Industrial Federation of Textile, Leather and Garment Trade Unions 
(IFTLGTU) is composed of 47,812 members, with women representing a slightly 
larger share (52.8 percent) than men. 
 
 
Table 2: Sectoral trade unions: Number of members and basic trade unions 
	
Source: Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions, ‘CETU's Affiliated Industrial 
Federation and Trade Unions’ (CETU, Addis Ababa, 2015). 
 
 
  Although rarely mentioned in the press or captured by official statistics, there were 
reports of work stoppages and strikes within leather and textile manufacturing firms. 
Informants discussed how such events were often chaotic, short-lived, and rarely 
focused on wage bargaining. For instance, at a large vertically integrated Turkish 
textile company, the general manager described a three day strike that had taken place 
as a result of workers’ dissatisfaction with the quality of food offered in the firm’s 
canteen.65 In a European-owned leather goods factory, a work stoppage occurred due 
to a newly hired quality control officer being paid five dollars more than other 
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Basic Trade Unions Male Female Total
215 91820 50666 142823
72 29386 20548 49934
79 38272 9967 48239
82 22261 24921 47182
105 40737 6081 46818
261 13886 10134 24020
7 12540 8808 21348
31 16296 4805 21101
66 8895 5495 14390
918 274093 141425 415515Total
National Industrial Federation of Tourism Hotels and 
General Service Workers
Industrial Federation of Banking and Insurance Trade 
Unions of Ethiopia
Transport and Communication Workers Union Industrial 
Federation 
Federation of Commerce, Technical and Printing Trade 
Unions
Members
Federation of Food, Beverage, Tobacco, and Allied Trade 
Unions
The National Federation of Farm, Plantation, Fishery and 
Agro Industry Trade Unions
National Industrial Federation of Energy, Chemical and 
Mine Trade Unions
Industrial Federation of Textile, Leather, and Garment 
Trade Unions
The Ethiopian Industrial Federation of Construction, 




employees.66 Christopher Blattman and Stefan Dercon also observed small-scale 
protests at factories located outside Addis Ababa.67  
  Interviews with employees at Textiles Corp. and Leather Inc. shed further light on 
workers’ views with respect to trade unions and collective voice. At Textiles Corp., 
where a union was not present, workers were generally hopeful that the formation of a 
workers’ association would lead to improvements in wages and working conditions. 
This view was not universal, however. Haile, a 28-year-old worker in the samples 
department, believed that unions were unnecessary: 
 
The existence of labour unions is not relevant […] Whenever problems happened it can be 
solved immediately, so no need for a labour union. The company does give us annual 
leave, which is good. Last time I ran out of words to thank the company on stage because 
it organized a trip to […] and covered all costs. Labour unions are needed to ensure the 
rights of employees which over here is good.68 
 
  Haile’s lack of class consciousness can be partly explained by the efforts of 
management to limit the appeal of unionization. Indeed, during our visit to Textiles 
Corp, the general manager proudly showed us the large and airy factory floor, where 
at one end stood a stage with loudspeakers. This served as the site of a weekly 
meeting, during which he encouraged his employees to express their grievances. 
Although well-intentioned, these efforts were part of a ‘paternalistic’ strategy to 
minimize the appeal of unionization. 
  At Leather Inc. in contrast, a union was officially recognized and well established. 
However, few workers perceived the organization’s efforts in a positive light. At best, 
our interviewees believed the union was relatively inactive beyond collecting dues 
and providing financial support for burials or illnesses. At worse, workers thought the 
organization failed to address grievances, and one interviewee reported that the union 
only helped those with personal ties to its leadership. This was Fana’s (25 years old, 
sewing operator) response when we asked her to describe the union’s activities: 
 
Fana: I haven’t seen any of its activities, other than its existence. 
Interpreter: Can you talk to them when there is a problem? 
Fana: I haven’t encountered a problem, but someone who has a problem can contact them. 
Once upon a time there was a disagreement that happened between employees and the 
company, in which the labour union mediated the situation. 
Interpreter: Do you think there is any change in the factory because of the union? 
Fana: I didn’t see any change.69 
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  Fana’s view was in line with the information provided by managers in other firms; 
CETU and its sectoral affiliates struggle to gain positive recognition and legitimacy 
amongst workers. Informants referred to the lack of experience and skill of trade 
union representatives as a key obstacle for the effective translation of workers’ 
concerns into concrete actions.70 Moreover, CETU and the Industrial Federation of 
Textile, Leather and Garment Trade Unions (IFTLGTU) were rarely responsible for 
labour unrest in the two industries. To the contrary, union leaders generally were 
brought in after the emergence of disputes in order to mediate conflicts. CETU’s 
approach in turn led to a situation where many employers did not perceive trade 
unions to be useful negotiating partners. A firm manager believed that the union 
active in his company was ‘weak’ and struggled to ensure workers respected the rules 
of the collective bargaining agreement.71 Another representative from the business 
community made a perceptive comment, illustrating how unions may struggle to 
mobilize workers without some form of ‘collective identity’:72 ‘the workers will not 
be forced by the unions, unions don’t have the right to hire or fire’.73 Blame does not 
only rest at the feet of CETU, however. Other informants reported that many 
employers have resisted unionization efforts, and that union activists frequently face 
threats and dismissals. 
  Institutions that could potentially channel worker voice into improvements in wages 
or working conditions thus lack influence and power in the textile and leather 
industries in Addis Ababa. Studies on East Asian developmental states emphasize the 
absence of class consciousness or the preponderance of family ties as important 
factors behind the weakness of labour movements in the early stage of 
industrialization.74 Yet, the difficulties faced by the labour movement in Ethiopia also 
stem from the challenge of generating legitimacy. As Claus Offe and Helmut 
Wiesenthal argue, labour movements must rely on bureaucratic or collective forms of 
power to mobilize workers.75 Lacking either capacity, CETU and the IFTLGTU have 
struggled to exert influence on firms, even in their own local ‘node’ of the textile and 
leather GVC.76 Indeed, unionization did not represent a major concern for firms 
attempting to enter the global market. While Mark Anner argues that firms operating 
in the apparel GVC tend to avoid countries with strong unions in order to minimize 
disruptions to their value chain,77 we show in the next section that trade unions are not 
the only source of disturbance. The absence of effective ‘voice’ mechanisms has 
pushed workers to adopt ‘exit’ strategies in order to improve their circumstances, and 
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The labour turnover problem 
 
The case of Berhanu, a 26-year-old sewing operator at Textiles Corp, shows that 
when ‘voice’ fails, ‘exit’ is often the only alternative: 
 
Well we worked standing all day and the machinery was heavy. And they don’t consider 
that on your payment, there are no incentives or bonuses and besides there were chemicals. 
It affected our skins; they don’t provide you with safety equipment. I quitted for such 
reasons. We asked our supervisors, I waited for them to get better day after day but they 
don’t care so I left.78 
 
  The investors and managers we interviewed were nearly unanimous in describing 
turnover as the most common and costly labour issue for firms in the textile and 
leather industries. Florian Schaefer and Girum Abebe previously reported that the 
problem was prevalent in the cut-flower sector,79 and R. Renjith Kumar observed high 
turnover in a textile plant in the southwestern town of Arba Minch.80 Furthermore, in 
a randomized control trial comparing the well-being of industrial workers with self-
employed small business owners, Blattman and Dercon found that 78 percent of those 
who were assigned an industrial job had not only left their firm, but also the 
manufacturing sector by the end of the study.81 
  Many managers were puzzled by the high labour turnover. For instance, the general 
manager of Textiles Corp. described how he offered free lunches, adequate pay, 
medical services, and annual leave in order to retain his employees. He did not 
understand why workers only stayed for three to four months despite receiving these 
benefits. Other informants offered clearer interpretations: an Ethiopian firm manager 
mentioned that workers generally justified their departure by claiming they could 
obtain higher wages elsewhere. He also described how his company struggled to 
match the higher wages paid by foreign firms.82 This view is in line with Kumar’s 
survey of workers in a textile plant, where 50.7 percent of its employees reported that 
they would leave the company if they could find a better salary elsewhere.83  
  Several informants from the business community discussed the costs associated with 
high levels of turnover. For instance, a manager in a locally owned shoe factory 
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explained how turnover placed limits on his firm’s capacity to meet international 
quality standards: ‘[b]ecause of the turnover, most of the operators here are new, they 
cannot identify what exactly the problem is with the product’.84 At Bole Lemi 
industrial park in Addis Ababa – a large industrial estate which mostly caters to 
foreign apparel and footwear manufacturers – output has fallen short of expectations, 
with high labour turnover perceived as the main cause of poor performance. Various 
explanations for the situation were offered by government and firm representatives: 
low wages, workers’ unfamiliarity with industrial work, higher salaries in the 
construction and service industries in Addis Ababa, and the fact that most workers 
view work in an apparel or footwear factory as a temporary stage in their lives. Firm 
representatives put forth a final, related reason for high turnover: women leave their 
positions in textile and leather factories to work as domestic workers for much higher 
wages in the Middle East. 
  Blattman and Dercon argue that high turnover rates in Ethiopia’s manufacturing 
sector are the result of two processes: ‘learning and matching’ and workers’ response 
to shocks.85 The first suggests that workers take up industrial jobs without a clear 
understanding of the required effort level and quit after finding out the role does not 
match their expectations. The ‘shocks’ explanation, on the other hand, proposes that 
workers know industrial work to be unpleasant but accept manufacturing jobs as a 
stop-gap solution while awaiting better alternatives. Although these are plausible 
suggestions, Blattman and Dercon pay insufficient attention to the underlying 
structural features of Addis Ababa’s low-skilled labour market and to the ‘micro-
agency’ of labour.  
  With a large informal sector and a high unemployment rate, labour market 
conditions in Addis Ababa appeared to be slack at first glance.86 Yet, somewhat 
surprisingly, the workers we interviewed did not express major concerns around job 
security. While these views may be due to participants’ young age and lack of 
dependents, older interviewees and those with children expressed similar beliefs.  
Semi-skilled workers, especially those with cutting and sewing skills, are in high 
demand, and the labour market is perceived to be favourable. Indeed, one of the 
participants was confident that even if she left her current job, her employer would 
hire her again.   
  Workers’ beliefs regarding their ability to find work did not only revolve around 
their own employer or sector. During the interviews, almost all participants expressed 
a desire to leave their current employer once they had the means to start their own 
business. In fact, all but two workers expressed a preference for self-employment.87  
The informal labour market may be detrimental to the mobilization of labour as a 
collective actor, but for individual workers, it also appeared to provide somewhat of a 
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safety net.88 Indeed, several workers reported that they had second jobs such as petty 
traders, sewing contractors, or hairdressers.    
  In line with the ‘shocks’ explanation, very few workers described their decision to 
work in a factory as a positive choice. For many, however, quitting was a way to 
improve their life situation by finding work with better hours, slightly higher pay, or 
better health and safety conditions. Within the small sample of firms covered by our 
study, many employers reported how they had attempted to retain their semi-skilled 
workforce by offering meals, transport and a range of other incentives. Yet, even 
when workers expressed positive views concerning some of the practices enacted by 
Leather Inc. or Textiles Corp., they were not enough to generate attachment or loyalty 
to their firm. Many workers suggested they would leave immediately if a better offer 
came to their attention.  
  Workers’ protests through ‘exit’ generated costs for firms attempting to export their 
products. By pushing employers to offer better non-wage benefits, turnover also 
played at least some part in improving working conditions in the textile and leather 
industries. The finding aligns with Carswell and de Neve’s contention that the ‘micro-
agency’ of labour can have consequences for employment practices within GVCs.89 
Yet worker agency in the two industries must be understood in the context of 
relatively limited opportunities for advancement and the absence of effective voice 
mechanisms. Blattman and Dercon offer a plausible explanation of decision-making 
at the individual level but fail to consider broader institutional forces such as the 
weakness of trade unions. The level of demand for skills in occupational sub-markets 
and the availability of work in the informal sector also played some role in generating 
very low levels of attachment to firms. Market and institutional forces have been 
under-theorized in the literature on worker micro-agency, but the case of the textile 
and leather industries in Addis Ababa shows that contextual factors have an important 
influence on the strategies adopted by workers. 
 
 
No place for labour actors? 
 
Labour turnover did not have uniform consequences across all firms. Foreign 
companies appeared to find it easier to cope and tended to be more pro-active in 
addressing the problem. For instance, at Leather Inc., management expertly took 
advantage of the labour law by using collective bargaining to establish a piece-rate 
system, which achieved some success in reducing labour turnover. Another example 
is the case of Hawassa Industrial Park, Ethiopia’s flagship industrial park project for 
the apparel industry. Investors in the park formed an association to address the 
turnover problem, and, along with actors from the international donor community, 
implemented a project to screen potential workers. Applicants are categorized into 
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groups based on their age, gender, health and abilities, and trained in soft skills such 
as time-management, professionality, and hygiene, and then registered in an employee 
database from which firms in the park can recruit workers. Firms in the park are not 
permitted to lure workers by outbidding wages, and through the investors’ 
association, the firms offer the same minimum wage and establish clear guidelines for 
compensation at each grade and skill level. The general manager of a foreign apparel 
company set to begin operating in the park justified the project in the following 
manner: 
 
The idea with the investor’s association is that we need some sort of coordination, so that 
we don’t poach workers from each other. We have a common screening process for health 
and skills level. For example, for ironing, we need a strong male. For sewing, we need 
someone with good eyesight and finger dexterity.90 
 
  In contrast, locally owned Ethiopian firms often have an owner-manager model and 
tend to lack capacity and expertise in terms of human resource management.91 
Although several local owners and managers believed that high turnover was the 
result of foreign firms offering higher wages, the reality was more complex. As noted 
earlier, workers at Textile Corp. continued to leave in high numbers despite the firm 
offering relatively competitive wages and attractive non-wage benefits. The 
‘paternalistic’ employment relationship found within most locally owned firms 
therefore appeared to fall short. Part of the divergence lies in the fact that foreign 
firms can rely upon a wider range of resources such as access to expertise, the 
rationalization of human resource practices, and support from foreign governments. 
At the same time, although turnover appeared to affect the capacity of Ethiopian-
owned firms to participate in GVCs, the managers and owners we interviewed did not 
express major concerns around their ability to produce for the domestic market.   
  Despite differences in their approach, both foreign and locally owned firms generally 
addressed turnover without offering significant concessions to workers, particularly in 
terms of wages. The Ethiopian government has been broadly supportive of this 
strategy. 
  As previously noted, the relative freedom enjoyed by unions during the early 1990s 
was short-lived, and the governing regime quickly intervened to limit the labour 
movement’s independence. During interviews, CETU’s leadership also discussed 
several cases of firms that dismissed workers or took action to avoid the 
implementation of trade unions – a view supported by reports in the Ethiopian press.92 
  Moreover, most of the initiatives implemented to address turnover problems at the 
firm level, whether in the form of incentives or sanctions, bypassed trade unions. For 
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instance, CETU was not involved in the formulation of the plan to address labour 
turnover at Hawassa, and union leaders publicly expressed dissatisfaction regarding 
their exclusion from the decision-making process and the low level of the proposed 
minimum wage.93 Even amongst firm managers with mandates to meet corporate 
social responsibility standards, many did not report actively working with unions.  
  In addition, the government has recently targeted the high turnover rates through 
policies and actions which intentionally or unintentionally limit the ‘mobility power’ 
of workers. A recent example is the ruling party’s response to international migration 
patterns amongst young Ethiopians. As noted by Rogaly, workers commonly use 
short and long-term migration as a strategy to improve their circumstances.94 In 
Ethiopia, many young women travel to the Gulf and the Middle East in order to take 
up job opportunities as domestic workers.95 Citing human rights abuses, in 2014 the 
Ethiopian government banned all migration to Arab countries.96 Although its precise 
motives cannot be ascertained, the government’s decision is in line with some of the 
complaints expressed by the business community. A firm manager even drew a direct 
connection between the migration ban and the reduction of turnover amongst low-
skilled workers in his establishment.97 
  Carswell and De Neve have contributed significantly to the literature on labour and 
value chains by highlighting how the individual actions of workers can affect 
employment practices in the global south.98 Nonetheless, the authors pay insufficient 
attention to the response of investors and managers as well as the broader context in 
which such actions take place. As Richard Peet has shown, capitalists have a distinct 
mobility advantage over workers and are capable of circumventing collective forms of 
resistance through relocation.99 Moreover, it is generally easier for investors to 
coordinate their actions due to their similar economic interests and overlapping social 
networks.100 In Addis Ababa, well organized and funded institutions such as the Addis 
Ababa Chamber of Commerce play a key role in coordinating the interests of 
investors and employers. Investors also hold an advantage in their relationship with 
the Ethiopian government: the ruling regime’s legitimacy as a developmental state is 
highly dependent on the successful attraction of foreign direct investment. The issue 
is even more crucial in labour-intensive GVCs such as textile and leather, where low 
wages represent an important competitive advantage. Furthermore, an internal report 
prepared for the Ethiopian Chamber of Sectoral Associations suggests the high cost of 
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inputs and logistics limits the advantage firms can derive from the country’s low 
labour costs.101  
  In comparison, the individual-level resistance of workers is more diffuse. Although 
turnover has generated some short-term obstacles for GVC integration, the issue has 
not appeared to bring about significant gains beyond increasing the availability of 
non-wage benefits. Indeed, none of the managers we interviewed discussed increasing 
wages as a potential solution to limit turnover, and the government has taken actions 





This article assessed how workers’ pursuit of collective and individual goals 
influenced working conditions and wages in the textile and leather industries in and 
around Addis Ababa. It sought to evaluate how the actions of labour affected the 
trajectory of GVC integration in the two industries. We selected the leather and textile 
industries as case studies due to the government’s focus on the development of 
labour-intensive manufacturing, and because labour-intensive manufacturing was 
important for the successful industrialization of East Asian developmental states – a 
state model Ethiopia is actively emulating. 
  We first outlined the context of industrial relations in the country, focusing on the 
relatively weak position of CETU, Ethiopia’s national trade union federation, and 
then discussed the major challenge faced by firms in the two industries: high labour 
turnover. The lack of collective voice mechanisms, the low rewards of industrial 
work, and easy access to alternative employment opportunities in the informal sector 
and overseas, have meant that workers do not generally hold a leather or textile 
manufacturing job for very long. In turn, the high level of turnover placed limits on 
the capacity of some firms to compete successfully in the global market. Our article 
presented evidence showing that many textile and leather manufacturing firms 
responded by offering better benefits to workers such as subsidized lunches, health 
care services, and annual leave. Yet, the paternalistic tactics of many locally owned 
and foreign firms, along with the government’s restrictions on union activity and 
labour mobility, indicate that such developments occurred alongside a curtailment of 
labour power in both its individual and collective forms.  
  While our article provides further support for the idea that the ‘micro-agency’ of 
workers can shape work practices within GVCs, we also show that employers and the 
state can counteract this power. The successful cases of worker agency discussed in 
the literature describe community organizations and international trade union 
confederations as key actors, capable of helping workers put pressure on firms or able 
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to assist in monitoring the enforcement of international standards.102 Without the 
support of well-organized institutions of this type, it remains unclear how the micro-
resistance of workers can translate into a sustained transformation of employment 
conditions in a value chain. Over the long run, the superior capacity of investors to 
coordinate their actions is likely to provide a key advantage in the struggle to exert 
control over the production process. In some sense, the recent literature on ‘micro-
agency’ and GVCs must reconcile with the older focus of industrial relations research 
on collective actors and vice-versa. For instance, Anner has contributed significantly 
to the literature on labour and GVCs by arguing that worker strategies are influenced 
by ‘labour control regimes’.103 Yet his analysis is limited to purely collective forms of 
resistance: wildcat strikes, international accords, and transnational corporate 
campaigns. A complete explanation of labour outcomes within GVCs must consider 
the individual and collective forms of worker agency, the reactions of employers and 
the state, and the resources controlled by these actors. 
  The findings also raise interesting questions regarding the implications of a 
developmental state model for labour relations. Is the business-state alliance typically 
associated with the model necessarily antithetical to the interests of labour in the 
short-term, or are certain compromises possible? Moreover, do concessions to labour 
necessarily lead late-developers to lose their competitive edge? The ethnic-based 
protests and resignation of Prime Minister Haile Mariam Dessalegn illustrate that the 
Ethiopian government should not ignore the political and socio-economic dimension 
of its development plans. As Jonathan Fisher and Meressa Tsehaye Gebrewahd argue, 
expectations are high for the new administration of Abiy Ahmed,104 and the manner in 
which Ethiopia’s ruling party moves to address problems around the distribution of 
power between labour, capital and state elites will likely be crucial for the future 
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